Research

Working papers

• Shareholder Voice and Executive Compensation
  January 2026, submitted
  ssrn
  

  Abstract

  I estimate a model of CEO compensation with nonbinding shareholder approval votes (Say-on-Pay): shareholders can dissent on compensation decisions and punish the Board. Because the compensation proposal is endogenous to the voting environment itself, the threat of dissent disciplines pay ex ante and increases shareholder value by 2.97% on average, despite a 6% failure rate. I analyze counterfactual vote designs that alter the intervention and communication aspects of the vote. Binding votes pin pay to the last approved policy and may ignore new information about CEO ability. Designs that strengthen intervention while incorporating vote-revealed information may best benefit shareholders.

• Human Capital, Competition and Mobility in the Managerial Labor Market
  with Noah Lyman and Lin Zhao
  December 2025, submitted
  ssrn
  

  Abstract

  We pose a structural model of the managerial labor market with general and firm-specific human capital accumulation, managerial bargaining power, and imperfect labor market competition. Empirically, firm-specific human capital is an important driver of wage growth over tenure and experience; it also quantitatively restricts mobility and can help explain the low rate of external CEO hiring. We decouple bargaining power from labor market competition in determining managerial rent extraction, with the latter forming a significant portion, particularly for poached CEOs. We show that firm-specific skill accumulation shapes the dynamics of rent extraction: by raising match-specific productivity between the firm and manager, it increases growth in managerial rent extraction over tenure but lowers it over experience.

• Information and Preferences in Shareholder Voting
  with James Pinnington and Lin Zhao
  February 2026
  

  Abstract

  We develop a structural model of shareholder voting with incomplete information about proposal quality. Shareholders differ in their ownership stake, private information precision, and unconditional preference for passage. Equilibrium voting reflects both fundamentals and strategic inference from other shareholders' behavior. We estimate the model using voting records of US mutual funds and recover institution-level information and preference parameters. Preference-implied support can diverge sharply from realized support, showing that vote records alone are insufficient to measure investor preferences. We further quantify the impact of strategic voting and find that it materially lowers overall support and increases the share of vote results near the passing threshold.

• Executive Mobility in the United States, 1920-2023
  with John Graham, Dawoon Kim and Hyunseob Kim
  November 2025
  

  Abstract

  This paper studies the evolution of U.S. public-firm executive mobility from 1920 to 2023. Executive mobility exhibits a secular increase from the 1920s through the turn of the century. After peaking in the late-1990s, it declined sharply and stabilized at a lower level: chief executive mobility in the 2010s was less than half its late-1990s peak, returning to levels last seen in the 1960s and 1970s. Finance-chief mobility shows a stronger secular rise over the century. We argue that changes in the size of the executive labor market, the importance of general managerial skills, and the redeployability of assets help explain these trends.

Publications

• Hurdle Rate Buffers and Bargaining Power in Asset Acquisition
  with Bruce Carlin, Alan Crane and John Graham
  Journal of Financial Economics, April 2026
  published version; ssrn
  

  Abstract

  CFOs report using elevated hurdle rates that average 6.6 percentage points above the cost of capital. We show that hurdle rate buffers act as a commitment device and convey a bargaining advantage over counterparties during project development and M&A. This benefit can exceed the opportunity cost of forgone projects and acquisitions, preserving firm value. Consistent with our model, bidders’ elevated hurdle rates in M&A deals associate with higher surplus capture ex post; in CFO survey data, hurdle rate buffers negatively relate to ex ante bargaining power, and realized returns cluster just above elevated hurdle rates.

• Corporate Flexibility in a Time of Crisis
  with Murillo Campello, John Graham and Yueran Ma
  Journal of Financial Economics, June 2022
  published version; ssrn

  Abstract

  We use the COVID shock to study the direct and interactive effects of several forms of corporate flexibility on short- and long-term real business plans. We find that i) workplace flexibility, namely the ability for employees to work remotely, plays a central role in determining firms’ employment plans during the health crisis; ii) investment flexibility allows firms to increase or decrease capital spending based on their business prospects in the crisis, with effects shaped by workplace flexibility; and iii) financial flexibility contributes to stronger employment and investment, in particular when fixed costs are high. While the role of workplace flexibility is new to the COVID crisis, CFOs expect lasting effects for years to come: high workplace flexibility firms foresee continuation of remote work, stronger employment recovery, and shifting away from traditional capital investment, whereas low workplace flexibility firms rely more on automation to replace labor.