Hello! I am an Assistant Professor of Finance at Rice University. I study corporate finance, including topics related to the managerial labor market (including compensation, mobility and human capital), shareholder voting, and capital budgeting, among others.
I have a PhD in Finance from the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University and a BA in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and Sociology (PPES) from Trinity College Dublin.
Updates
- 2025.12.08: Presenting Executive Mobility in the United States, 1920-2023 at the Fall 2025 Labor and Finance Conference and the LSU Mardi Gras Conference
- Completely new versions of Shareholder Voice and Executive Compensation, Information and Preferences in Shareholder Voting, and Executive Mobility in the United States, 1920-2023 coming very soon!
- 2025.09.15: New version Human Capital, Competition and Mobility in the Managerial Labor Market
- Presensing at NBER Economics of Executive Compensation Conference on 2025.10.09
Job market paper
Shareholder Voice and Executive Compensation
December 2024
ssrnAbstract
I estimate a model of CEO compensation with non-binding shareholder approval votes (Say-on-Pay). The Board sets compensation and (relative to shareholders) may prefer high total pay; shareholders can fail the vote and punish the Board for high pay. Failed votes are perceived as costly by the Board and shareholders: Say-on-Pay resembles a costly punishment mechanism, raising firm value by 2.4% on average, despite only 7% of votes failing. I analyze a counterfactual binding vote: failure binds pay to prior levels, which may not reflect current information about CEO ability. The failure rate falls, pay levels increase and firm value decreases.